3 Skepticism
Roelof Risselada and Wout Lijzenga
Introduction to Skepticism
Skepticism is one of the oldest and most fundamental methods in philosophy. Its central question is in essence quite simple: How do we know what we claim to know, and are we justified in holding this belief? Where other approaches to philosophy try to build systems of thought or offer explanations of reality, like dialectics or ethics, skepticism as an attitude behaves as if it were a test, specifically used to doubt knowledge claims and their justifications. It asks whether the reasons we give are good enough, and what happens if we try to imagine situations in which those reasons fail.
The roots of skepticism can be traced to Socrates (469–399 BCE). In Plato’s Apology, Socrates wrestles with the Oracle’s claim that “no one is wiser than Socrates.” Socrates denies having any wisdom, but after questioning the supposed experts of Athens, he concludes that their claims to knowledge are not founded in sufficiently rational accounts. They believed they knew much, but lacked rationally sufficient justification for their beliefs. Socrates’ skeptical insight was that he, at least, knew that he did not know. This negative realization became the foundation of his philosophical practice: examining both his own and others’ views to see if they could withstand scrutiny.
Later, Pyrrho of Elis (c. 360–270 BCE) established skepticism as a distinct school of thought based on the attitude. Followers of this school argued that epoché, which translates to suspension of judgment, was the most rational position to hold with regards to situations where the right- or wrongness of a statement was unclear. When confronted with equally strong arguments for and against a claim, they held a position which was free from dogmatism and granted them a peaceful perspective so that they could contemplate the matter.
In early modern philosophy, René Descartes (1596–1650) used the skeptical attitude as a method of inquiry. In his Meditations, Descartes systematically doubted everything, his senses, his body, even mathematics, in search of indisputably true knowledge. He concluded that even if an evil demon deceived him about everything, the very act of doubting proved his existence as a thinking subject: cogito, ergo sum (“I think, therefore I am”). This became his new foundation.
In the twentieth century, skepticism evolved further in epistemology. The Gettier problem (1963) famously challenged the long-standing definition of knowledge as justified true belief (JTB). Gettier showed that a belief can be true and justified, yet still fail to count as knowledge if its truth rests on mere luck. The classic clock example illustrates this: You walk into a room and see a clock showing 11:00. You believe it is 11:00. It happens to be true. But if the clock has been broken for weeks and only coincidentally shows the correct time at that moment, you were right, but only by accident. The skeptic jumps on this fragility to argue that truth and justification must be more tightly connected if we want to call something knowledge.
Across these examples, the skeptical method is a practice: a way of challenging and refining knowledge claims. Its value lies in testing the strength of our beliefs and pushing us to greater clarity.
The Constructive Skeptic’s Toolkit
The Skeptical Method: Step by Step
To make skepticism usable as a tool, it helps to describe it as a series of practical steps. While the historical figures emphasize different aspects, the following structure captures the core of the skeptical approach.
1. Identify the claim
Start with a clear statement that someone presents as knowledge. For example: “I know it is 11:00.”
2. Examine the justification
Ask: what reasons support the claim? Is it based on perception, testimony, memory, reasoning? What is taken for granted in those reasons? What is meant by the word ”knowing” and how does this relate to the truth value of the claim?
3. Introduce possible doubt
Challenge the justification by considering scenarios in which the claim could be false. A skeptic that acts out of good faith does not assume the claim is false, but asks whether the justification is strong enough to rule out error: The clock case shows how coincidence can undermine justification. It really is 11:00, but because the clock is broken, the belief is only true by accident. The person would have believed it just as well if it were 11:01, thus the justification for the claim is not sufficient in its ability to rule out all doubt and coincidence.
4. Suspend judgment
Instead of rushing to accept or reject the claim, hold it in suspension. This is the Pyrrhonian move: a skeptic should withhold asserting the assumption to see what further support is needed. But, as we shall see in the various applications of this method, we should define ‘sufficient’ with respect to the context in which we apply it. A sufficient justification for a belief within for instance a political debate, might not survive the extreme skeptical pressure in a philosophical discourse.
5. Refine or reinforce the claim
Decide whether the belief survives skeptical pressure. If it fails, the claim needs revision. If it holds up, it becomes stronger. For example: “I know it is 11:00 because the clock, my phone, and the radio all confirm it.” Even if it might not remove all doubt from the equation, it strengthens our claims nevertheless.
In this way, skepticism functions less as a way of tearing down knowledge than as a process of filtering and strengthening claims.
Varieties of Skepticism
Skepticism comes in different forms, ranging from constructive to extreme.
Constructive or “positive” skepticism uses doubt to strengthen claims
Socratic questioning, Descartes’ methodological doubt, and Gettier-style thought experiments all serve to improve clarity and reliability. This is the form of skepticism that can be fruitfully applied in everyday reasoning, politics, or science.
Extreme or “negative” skepticism takes the method to its logical limits.
Consider the argument from the brain in a vat thought experiment.*
*The brain in a vat thought experiment comes down to the hypothetical scenario that we are experiencing reality from and as a brain in a vat that has been connected to a super computer, in essence it was meant to let us doubt the existence of the external world. Check out a video on the case.
This line of reasoning can be captured more formally in a skeptical argument, which makes explicit how radical doubt can undermine even our most basic knowledge claims:
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- If I cannot rule out that p is false, then I do not know that p.
- I cannot rule out that p is false (because of dreaming, illusion, deception, etc.).
- Therefore, I do not know that p.
By this reasoning, we cannot even know that we have hands. While logically valid, such skepticism is practically paralyzing. It demonstrates the limits of our justifications, but few would endorse it as a guide for everyday life.
Agrippa’s Trilemma
This is yet another one of the extremes that can hinder the practicality of our method, named after the Greek skeptic philosopher Agrippa from the 1st century BC.
If every belief requires justification, then either (a) justification proceeds in an infinite regress, (b) it becomes circular, or (c) it stops at some unjustified foundation. None of these options seems fully satisfying. The trilemma shows how fragile our claims to certainty really are. Yet it also motivates us to think carefully about what counts as “good enough” justification in practice. In essence it all comes down to the context in which we test our knowledge and what counts as sufficient justification respective of that context.
Skepticism in Practice
So how can this method be used beyond the philosophy seminar?
- Philosophy and science
Skepticism is crucial for testing definitions and theories. The Gettier problem forced epistemologists to revise or abandon the JTB model. In science, skepticism underpins peer review: claims are not accepted until they survive repeated questioning and replication. This has proven instrumental to philosophical and scientific progress. It is however important to note that the sufficiency of a justification is the most demanding in these contexts, as they stand to gain the most with regards to even the extreme examples. - Public debate
Skepticism can reveal whether political arguments rest on evidence or rhetoric. When a politician claims, “This policy will make everyone safer,” the skeptic asks: what counts as evidence, what alternative explanations exist, and what would falsify the claim? Having said that, the public debate stands to gain little to nothing from extreme skepticism, here we should loosen our understanding of sufficient justification. - Everyday life
In an age of social media, skepticism is indispensable. When reading a headline that confirms your bias, skepticism asks: is this claim reliable, is it corroborated, could it be manipulated? Suspension of judgment here prevents misinformation from spreading.
What can we gain from the skeptical method?
When practiced constructively, skepticism yields three key benefits:
Clarity: by uncovering hidden assumptions and shaky justifications.
Humility: by reminding us that certainty is rare and error is common.
Stronger claims: by reinforcing those beliefs that survive skeptical pressure.
This aligns with Gadamer’s (2000) hermeneutic insight that “the other could be right.” Skepticism is characterised by an openness to alternative views, not as threats but as opportunities to refine our own understanding. This would prove intensely beneficial with regards to polarizing debates in society, which are usually defined by a group’s tendency to view the other group’s view as dumb, shortsighted or simply absurd.
At the same time, skepticism must be handled carefully; reckless use of philosophical tools can lead to paralyzing doubt without strengthening beliefs or dialogue. But when applied with care, skepticism helps us suspend premature judgment, listen to others, and search for “good enough” grounds for shared knowledge. Be a true skeptic, discover fundaments for a shared knowledge base.
Links to other tools
Skepticism connects naturally with the other methods in this pressbook volume, such as:
The chapter on Phenomenology and the chapter on Alternative explanations.
Applying skepticism to polarization
Skepticism applied to Teaching
Introduction
When talking about the application of a philosophical method we ought to remind ourselves where we started our philosophical journey. Some of the readers might have enjoyed the privilege of experiencing philosophy as a middle school course, or have studied it at university, although chances are that the journey started whilst reading this particular book. In this chapter I argue that teaching a philosophical method like skepticism to every age group, but specifically middle school students, has a mitigating effect on the amount of polarization that exists in society. The central issue that gets addressed, is the growing polarization in public discourse and the insufficient ability among young people to critically evaluate claims and engage in reasoned dialogue. This will be done by giving some societal and philosophical context, a description on how to effectively teach middle school students about these subjects and two relevant philosophical exercises.
Teaching middle school children about skepticism? Why should we?
First I find it fitting that I should justify my choice of application with regards to skepticism. If we are to remedy our society’s polarization, which has proven to be a great hindrance in public debate, we ought to start at the core. If we teach our children and adolescents how to reason, argue and think critically, then they are much less likely to be coerced or misled by the media, charlatans and sly rhetoric. I argue that teaching children to be more skeptical towards their own and others’ beliefs in a scientific and constructive way, will result in them growing up to be more critical thinkers. In turn they will be able to deliberate, debate and converse about controversial topics. Once we equip them with the skill to use philosophical methods, specifically skepticism, they will be able to lessen polarization in public debate and defend the dialogue that proves essential to solving societal problems and aiding collaboration amongst citizens. Additionally, they will be able to notice when debates take a polarizing turn and know how they can defend themselves from misinformation and specific framing.
Why do we ought to defend dialogue in public debate?
If philosophy has taught us anything, it is that truth rarely emerges from isolation. Dialogue lies at the heart of philosophy, in the constant testing of ideas through reasoning and communication. Yet in public debate today, dialogue is often replaced by merely stating one’s beliefs, monologue after monologue, not arguments exchanged in good faith. To defend dialogue is therefore to defend the very process through which understanding can grow . And a skeptical attitude practiced as a reasoning method, as we have shown in our introduction, does precisely that.
How do we effectively teach middle school students about skepticism and polarization?
We need to take into account that our audience consists of middle school children who possibly have a limited understanding of the notions of skepticism, epistemic virtues and polarization. In order to answer the main question we need to build a strong foundation of knowledge on which we can build our lecture. If we want to grant them an adequate level of understanding with regards to these complex concepts, we will have to mold our material in a way that fits their educational level and attention span. Our format will be an interactive visual presentation of around 70 minutes combined with fitting exercises and discourse. The lecture ought to be structured in such a way that the students learn how to tell the good skepticism from the bad and how skepticism, when used as a method, can grant them the ability to investigate their own and others’ beliefs in a constructive manner. As well as understanding how this method might have a mitigating effect on polarization in public discourse.
How I effectively taught skepticism and polarization.
I gave a 70-minute guest lecture on skepticism and polarization at a Dutch middle school (Havo 3). The format was an interactive visual presentation built around our initial tool description, group discussion, and short exercises. The aim was to show how the skeptical method can be applied in real-life contexts and why they should apply this method.
Learning goals for the students
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You understand what skepticism entails as a method.
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You understand what polarization means in relation to social issues.
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You are able to make connections between applying the skeptical method and its influence on polarization.
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You have grown as a person and as a philosopher in your resilience against polarization, in terms of recognizing and possibly reducing it.
How did these goals shape the lecture?
The session began with a few simple questions: What can we know? When do we know something and how do we know it? This introduced skepticism as a concrete method rather than mere doubt. Using examples from Socrates and Pyrrho, the students learned, as you have already read in the introduction, that epoché, or suspension of judgment, is itself a deliberate act of reasoning.
From there, we explored two forms of skepticism that remind us of our initial tool description:
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Good-faith skepticism — critical, open, and truth-seeking;
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Bad-faith skepticism — selective, dogmatic, or self-serving.
How to grasp polarization?
In addition to this, I tried to make the concept of polarization accessible to them, so I connected it directly to the skeptical tools the students had just learned. After distinguishing between good-faith and bad-faith skepticism, we discussed how disagreements in society are able to result in conflict, not because of the topic itself, but because people apply skepticism selectively. I explained that polarization refers to a process where mutual understanding dies out and people with opposing views become more confident in their respective stances.
To ground this in their own experience, I asked students to offer examples of polarizing issues they encountered in their daily lives, in discussions about climate change, social media debates, or at the dinner table. Together, we analysed which elements of those examples showed signs of polarization: reliance on stereotypes, dismissal of sources without evaluation, or framing the other side as inherently wrong or stupid.
By comparing these cases to the earlier distinction between good-faith and bad-faith skepticism, the students could see how certain skeptical habits can either reduce or amplify polarization.
Simplified version of our initial tool description.
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THE SKEPTICAL METHOD
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Identify the claim
State clearly what is being said or believed. Ask: What is the claim? -
Examine the justification
Ask why someone believes this claim. What reasons, evidence, or assumptions support it? -
Introduce possible doubt
Consider ways the claim could be false. Think of counterexamples, alternative explanations, or missing information. -
Suspend judgment
If the evidence is unclear, do not immediately accept or reject the claim. Hold your conclusion in suspension. -
Refine or reinforce the claim
Decide what should happen next: Does the claim need more support? Should it be revised? Or has it become stronger after careful doubt?
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A short video-exercise
This video that followed a journalist at a right-wing political demonstration in The Hague, illustrated how distrust can shift from constructive criticism to conspiratorial rejection of all authority. This example triggered lively discussion about why people trust some sources but disregard others, as well as giving the students explicit examples of polarization and its possible causes.
I asked them the following questions in relation to the video:
Are aspects of the skeptical method being applied?
Is this done in good faith or in bad faith?
Which examples of polarization can we extract from the video?
The answers they gave during the classroom dialogue were critical and humble. The central pedagogical insight was that skepticism can either bridge or deepen divides depending on how it is used. When practiced in good faith, it sharpens understanding and strengthens dialogue; when abused, it paves the way for polarization.
Key takeaways and summary of the lecture
We argued that teaching skepticism to a specific group like middle school children would have a mitigating effect on polarization in society, since an uninformed and unskilled population is bound to drown in the strong tides of polarization. I found that a meaningful application would be to spread relevant knowledge through a fitting format and fun philosophical exercises. In doing the exercises the students showed competence, critical thinking skills and intellectual honesty. They were avid in asking questions and came up with relevant personal metaphors in order to fully understand the exercise. One of the students asked me: “Sir, when me and my brother are in verbal conflict, he tends to doubt everything I say and disregards most of the counter arguments that I come up with, does that mean he is a bad-faith skeptic?” This and more similar examples proved to me that these students started to understand the skeptical method and how they could apply it to everyday scenarios.
The most fruitful exercise proved to be a version of the one where we discussed the energy drink case; this resulted in the students working in pairs and answering the relevant questions. If you are interested in all of the materials that were used in the PowerPoint you are welcome to have a look here. In this document you can find the exercises and additional lecture materials that were used in the slides.
I am confident in stating that the students learned valuable lessons with regard to the different ways in which someone can practice skepticism, as well as its relation to polarization and how a constructive skeptical attitude might ease polarization in public debates. I left that group of middle school students a tad more critical and open towards dialogue than I found them. And my hope is that the same is true for the average reader of this pressbook.
Philosophical exercise: suspension of judgment in a polarised debate
Suppose that a politician says that the housing crisis is caused by an invasion of foreigners and the only way to solve this problem is by closing the borders.
- Analyse the claim
Write the main claim in one sentence and identify its emotional tone or framing. For instance, emotionally charged language (like “invasion of foreigners”) is a red flag that should trigger skepticism about the claim’s objectivity. - Map the reasoning
What arguments or data are offered, or can be thought of? Which assumptions underlie them? - Investigate context
Search (or imagine) counterexamples and background factors that might complicate the claim, such as economic policy, housing shortages, labour markets, privatization, etc. - Suspend judgment
Before deciding whether the claim is true or false, discuss in groups what information is still missing and what would count as sufficient justification in this political context. Do we have sufficient backing for or against the claim? - Reflect on yourself
Note moments in the discussion where you felt the urge to take sides. What triggered that? How did group dynamics influence your reasoning? Were you inclined to agree with your friends, or disregard information that refuted the claim? Be honest!
Relevance
This exercise moves beyond simply identifying and doubting a claim. And although this exercise is heavily inspired by the tool description in our introduction, it places the skeptical method within a social and emotional environment where beliefs are politically charged. This means not merely advocating for the suspension of judgment in complex scenarios, but also forcing students to recognise that genuine suspension of judgment requires awareness of their own biases and group influence.
The process of judging statements to be true or false usually takes place intuitively; by means of this exercise, this is made methodological and rigid. After practicing, our students will be more inclined to look at the facts supporting statements rather than the sentiment embedded within them.
Philosophical exercise: Good-Faith or Bad-Faith Skepticism?
Try to imagine the following scenario:
You are having a WhatsApp conversation with a friend about a news story.
You: “NOS reported that energy drinks are bad for your heart.”
Friend: “Yeah right, that’s nonsense. The government just makes that up to scare young people.”
You: “Well, I also saw studies from the RIVM and the Heart Foundation.”
Friend: “They’re all bought by the government. No one tells the truth anymore.”
You: You stay curious and search for more sources. You find one advertisement blog claiming energy drinks are harmless and five independent studies showing health risks.
Friend: “Everyone says something different. You can’t trust anyone anymore.”
Answer the following questions with the tool description in mind:
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Who in this dialogue demonstrates good-faith skepticism?
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Where does the skeptical attitude used by your friend get pushed to its logical limits?
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How could you respond to keep the dialogue open and constructive?
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What signs show that doubt is being used to seek truth rather than to reject it? Or aren’t there any?
- Which steps of our initial tool description are being followed and might someone be selective in the steps that are being followed?
Relevance and context
Our friend in this scenario has shifted from selective skepticism (only doubting what contradicts his views) to radical skepticism (doubting everything). Neither attitude represents the balanced, constructive skepticism that we have come to find underused in current polarizing debates. In doing this exercise students will learn to identify when skepticism ceases to be constructive and from which moment the tool gets pushed to its logical limits. As we saw in the tool description, this can lead us to absurd conclusions like not having hands, or not believing a claim when we have more than enough evidence in favor of it. This mirrors real-life discussions where skepticism turns from a virtue into a vice, and invites our students to be critical of the ways in which the skeptical attitude might be practiced.
This experiment shows how a ”good-faith” skeptic method falls into the despair of a ”bad-faith” one and that this is one of the causes for polarization within certain debates.
Skepticism applied to Affective Polarization
Societal life is increasingly marked by ideological segregation, giving rise to incompatible stances, also known as polarization. Where a political society may prosper by means of ideological differences, polarization makes living together challenging. Initially, polarization is a mere description of strongly opposing opinions, but it can eventually result in a refusal to accept one’s opponents’ views of the truth. This ”factual” polarization is characterized by disagreement regarding both the content and the constituents of knowledge and truth. At an advanced stage, polarization is not exclusively about disagreement with regard to knowledge claims; there is an alarming shift towards the generalization of opposing viewpoints and a growing aversion to people with different opinions.
“The Romantic movement bequeathed us the beguiling but often disastrous notion that it is our emotions that are always our finest guides.” Nikos Marinos
This is evidently a modern revival of the obsession with emotions. This is nothing new in history, as emotion was also emphasized over reason in Romanticism. Many statements nowadays are justified by: “because I feel it that way.” Exactly at this point, the shift takes place from content-based polarization to emotional polarization; this phenomenon is labelled ”affective polarization.”
A Case of Affective Polarization
This shift from ideological differences towards affective polarization is clearly illustrated by an example of ‘elite left-wing liberals’ versus ‘farmers’ in the Netherlands. Initially, the scientific approach to cattle farming in particular was universally shared, and delivered by Wageningen University, amongst others. In the course of the late twentieth century, scientific approaches to the environment emerged (Club of Rome, The Limits to Growth). In the years thereafter, science affirmed the idea that human behavior heavily affects both the environment and the climate. In a small and densely populated country like the Netherlands with a substantial livestock farming sector, frictions soon emerged between environmentalists and cattle farmers. Ideological and political interpretations of science started to diverge. In the early twenty-first century, the shift from ideology towards affective polarization took place, e.g. Agractie (a Dutch farmers’ protest group) versus D66 (a socially liberal and progressive political party in the Netherlands). On the one hand, ‘climate skeptic’ farmers borrow phrases from scientific and philosophical discourse, using key statements such as ‘How can you be sure?’, ‘Not necessarily’, or ‘But, what if…?’ to undermine scientific knowledge; examples of ‘bad-faith skepticism’. On the other hand, left-wing liberals tend to assert a monopoly on the truth by applying scientific methods to nearly everything; as ‘true skeptics’, they sometimes think they have overcome doubt, for instance on issues like the environment. The ‘know-it-alls’ became opposed to the ‘doubt-or-deny-it-alls’.
Consensus on facts about the causes of pollution and environmental consequences crumbled away. As soon as the fundament of a shared vision on facts disintegrates, the knowledge edifice becomes instable and the underlying emotions and passions – also known as ‘affects’ – are laid bare. Most people tend to identify strongly with ‘their’ group of origin, strongly condemning the opposing group. Our focus here is primarily on negative emotions directed to ‘others’, since it seems easier for partisans to ascribe negative emotions to the outgroup than positive ones to the ingroup (Versteegen, 2024).
In analogy with Marx’ (1818-1883) view on economics, affects can be considered as the basis of opinion formation, and reason as the superstructure. Thus, one strategy to combat polarization would be to focus on restoring the affective basis first and then try to bridge the gaps in the superstructure, namely the factual disagreement.
‘Emotional Skepticism’, How Skepticism Deals with the Affects
Once the point of affective polarization has been reached, skepticism in the intellectual sphere seems to get stuck in a dead-end street. Skepticism toward emotions may serve as a catalyst for carrying forward the discussion. But why be skeptical of emotions serving as justifications in the first place?
David Hume (1711-1776) inverted Plato’s idea that Reason’s task is to maintain control over the ‘passions’, in contemporary society referred to as emotions. Hume’s phrase, however, reads: ‘Reason is the slave of the passions’. Maybe ‘slave’ is too potent a term, but the idea that Reason is at least heavily influenced by and intertwined with emotions is generally accepted, nowadays. A witty description of the error-prone brain is – due to its similar shape – the ‘faulty walnut’ . The ‘walnut’ could and should be recognized as humbly fallible, especially when it comes to justifications based on emotions. The ‘walnut’ is heavily influenced, if not distorted, by tiredness, lust, interpretation of others, mood, projection, flattery, fear, egocentrism; it has only a fragile empathetic capacity, is not an independent thinker (dependent on group opinions; tribalism), shows atypical behavior in packs, and prefers short-term to long-term thinking.
“We are keener to conclude that we have developed a deep resentment against humanity than that we urgently need to go to bed.” School of Life
All in all, there is enough reason to be modest about rationality and its generally-assumed independence of the ‘passions’. Since it is impossible to employ a kind of epistemological litmus test to dip into these emotions, we must question them thoroughly.
How to address emotions? How to question these shaky fundaments of knowledge?
In the first part of this chapter, it was explained that skepticism regarding knowledge has both a destructive and a constructive side. Constructive skepticism as described is the activity of investigating beliefs about knowledge claims and seeing whether factual polarization can be addressed by the skeptical method. Is there something similar to be found regarding affective polarization? Yes. There is a strain in philosophy called Emotional Skepticism. The essential characteristic of Emotional Skepticism is being vigilant about the effects of emotions, passions, physical problems, and psychosocial circumstances on supposedly rational convictions and opinions, with the overarching aim of fixing the basis, so that the superstructure can be restored. Emotional Skepticism addresses both others’ and one’s own beliefs and emotions. Like in the above-mentioned trilemma, many everyday beliefs or convictions are ultimately based on something other than knowledge; this might very well be an emotion or a feeling. That emotion can be questioned with the help of the Emotional Skeptic method.
Emotional Skepticism is a philosophical method to inquire into the origin of emotions along with the effects emotions have on seemingly rational utterances or claims of knowledge. Physical states or mood differences have a notably strong influence on what people ‘think’ and their opinions.
So, the general method of skepticism can be applied in a two-tier approach to both the basis and the superstructure level of polarization. First, the Emotional Skeptic method is to be applied to the affective level, constantly questioning the primary reaction towards the other: ‘Is it true that the other is as bad as I thought initially?’ Ultimately, the origin of emotions can be uncovered. The intended constructive effects of this applied Emotional Skeptic method consist of increased engagement by opposing parties, due to shared emotions, or mutual recognition of shared emotional experiences. Eventually, emotional influences on reason may become more modest, less accentuated, and ameliorated. Secondly, after the affective polarization has been overcome, constructive skepticism can be applied to facts, truth claims, and opinions in the political debate.
The good thing is that Emotional Skepticism is a modification of, but essentially a largely identical variant of, skepticism, as shown in the Constructive Skeptic’s Toolkit scheme in the first section of this chapter.
Emotional Skepticism, step by step
Step 1. Identify the emotional reaction, instead of a truth claim. This requests a more person-directed style of questioning; it is about ‘yourself’.
Step 2. Examine the origin of that emotion, along the lines of exercise ‘Unravel your core beliefs’.
Step 3. Introduce doubt by questioning and contradicting these core beliefs. A helpful method is described and practiced in exercise ‘The mirror’.
Step 4. The role of epoché in this context is to prevent one from jumping to conclusions based on emotions.
Step 5. Refine the emotional reaction and ameliorate the effect of emotions on rationality.
Alternatively, initial opponents can discover they stand on common ground, emotionally.
Depolarization, demanding non-philosophical skills, yet being philosophically informed
Polarization proves to be a persistent issue. However, it is of vital democratic importance to continuously resist and combat polarization in all its manifestations. As long as polarization remains merely ideological, the solution is (polite) discussion or debate. Upon the occurrence of an affectively-laden discussion, real conflict handling becomes essential. Crucial in handling affective polarization is the skill of ‘dealing with conflict’ and de-escalating discussions by means of finding neutral ground, a core competence in the current societal discussion.
“We have two ears and one mouth; therefore, we should listen twice as much as we speak.” Zeno of Citium (ca. 335-265 B.C.)
The aim of depolarization is not so much reaching an agreement on all facts and on appropriate emotional reactions, as it is to reach a level of interaction between parties on which reciprocity in mutual contact can be restored. Courageous field philosophers are needed in this process to act as philosophically-informed interlocuters and discussion moderators. By means of the emotional skeptical approach a first step can be made, namely conflict identification (step 1). Once there is consensus on the currently conflicting emotions, the field philosopher practices her skills. Of general importance is the application of effective communication skills and finding the right tone in such delicate conversations.
“[…] der Andere könnte Recht haben.” Hans-Georg Gadamer (2000)
But a specific skill in conflict management is that of multidirectional partiality (Boszormenyi-Nagy, 1966), originally introduced in relationship and family psychotherapy. Since opposing parties entangled in affective polarization show a remarkable resemblance to quarrelling spouses, contemporary society might need some relationship counseling (idea borrowed from R. Safranski, 1994). Multidirectional partiality is a dialectical approach to relationships whereby every judgment about a relational position will be offset, sooner or later, by a respective judgment about the position of the discussion partner (BehaveNet). This attitude allows the field philosopher to empathize with both parties.
So, in order to be constructive, Emotional Skepticism should be applied. The field philosopher could start to practice multidirectional partiality in applying the ‘Downward Arrow Technique’, as explained and trained in the Exercise: Unravel core beliefs in this section (step 2). First directed at one party and then at the other. Once the core beliefs of all parties have been established, it is time for the next step, namely: introducing doubt and eventually stimulating empathy for the opponent(s) (step 3). The method, explained and trained in the Exercise: The mirror in this application section, is an appropriate vehicle to relate one’s own feelings and convictions to other people’s behavior. The field philosopher could supervise this process. The interesting part of skepticism is the plea for epoché. Similarly, it prevents jumping to conclusions based on emotions (step 4). If the external influences on emotions are diminished and the effects of emotions on opinion formation are ameliorated, then part of the emerging problems will probably be easier to handle (step 5), bringing the less affectively laden rationales back to the intellectual domain to be discussed more reasonably.
Conclusion
If this de-escalating skeptic maneuver succeeds, affective polarization will be diminished or ameliorated. Subsequently, farmers, environmental scientists and left-wing liberal politicians will have to use the skeptical method in the intellectual sense: questioning the underlying science until common ground is reached, from which they can then start constructively working towards solutions.
In this exercise, you are going to discover your basic beliefs about another person with a – from your point of view – dissenting opinion. How? By applying the Downward Arrow Technique:
- Imagine a member of a group you feel strong aversion towards.
- Make note of your first thought about that person. This, we call: a surface level thought.
- Apply the Downward Arrow Technique by asking yourself: “If that were true, what would it mean?” or “What is really so bad about that?”
- With this, you arrive at: intermediary beliefs.
- Repeat step 3, until you cannot go any further.
- At this point, you arrive at your core beliefs!
This suffices for now; the importance of becoming aware of your core beliefs is that you might want to challenge these to eventually bridge the affective gap!
For example:
A farmer watches an interview with an environmentalist politician, and reacts thus:
“Wise-ass!”
“If that were true, what would it mean?”
“They always pretend to know it all.”
“What is really so bad about that?”
“They don’t really know what they’re talking about.”
“If that were true, what would it mean?”
“They pretend to care about the environment, but we work in nature on a daily basis.”
“If that were true, what would it mean?”
“I truly love nature! (And they don’t.)”
An additional, advanced exercise (corresponding to the alternative, as mentioned in step 5 of Emotional Skepticism, step by step):
Try to start from the opposite position. In our case: imagine a left-wing liberal scrutinizing a farmer demonstrating against limitations on nitrogen emissions. See whether you can end up with the same core belief!
Exercise: The mirror
…or: what your critique of others tells you about yourself.
Watch people. Take note of your intuitive, spontaneous criticism of a single person, as soon as it surfaces in the domain of your conscious processing. Try to reframe the criticism into something you yourself perhaps lack or are jealous of.
For example:
“Aggressive demonstrator” might by inverted into “I wish I were so courageous as to express my anger so clearly.”
“Noisy fellow” into “I wish I had the energy and assertiveness to speak up.”
“Wise-ass” into “I wish I dared to show some of my knowledge.”
Literature
Vogt, Katja, “Ancient Skepticism”, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Winter 2022 Edition), Edward N. Zalta & Uri Nodelman (eds.), URL = <https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2022/entries/skepticism-ancient/>.
Comesaña, Juan and Peter Klein, “Skepticism”, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Spring 2024 Edition), Edward N. Zalta & Uri Nodelman (eds.), URL = <https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2024/entries/skepticism/>.
Ichikawa, Jonathan Jenkins and Matthias Steup, “The Analysis of Knowledge”, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2024 Edition), Edward N. Zalta & Uri Nodelman (eds.), URL <https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2024/entries/knowledge-analysis/>.
Baggini, J., & Fosl, P. S. (2010). The philosopher’s toolkit : a compendium of philosophical concepts and methods (2nd ed). Wiley-Blackwell. https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&scope=site&db=nlebk&db=nlabk&AN=312278
Comesaña, Juan and Peter Klein, “Skepticism”, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Spring 2024 Edition), Edward N. Zalta & Uri Nodelman (eds.), URL = <https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2024/entries/skepticism/>.
Hatfield, Gary, “René Descartes”, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Summer 2024 Edition), Edward N. Zalta & Uri Nodelman (eds.), URL = <https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2024/entries/descartes/>.